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This Essay addresses the Berne Convention’s prohibition on the imposition
of “formalities” on the “enjoyment and the exercise” of copyright,1 and the
compatibility with that cornerstone norm of international endeavors to
facilitate mass digitization, notably by means of extended collective licensing
and “opt-out” authorizations.2 In the Berne context, “enjoyment” means the
existence and scope of rights; “exercise” means their enforcement. Voluntary
provision of copyright notice and of title-searching information on a public
register of works and transfers of rights is fully consistent with Berne and
should be encouraged. But the Berne Convention significantly constrains
member states’ ability to impose mandatory formalities on foreign authors. I
specify “foreign authors,” because the Berne Convention’s minimum
substantive norms (including the no-formalities rule) do not apply to domestic
authors in the work’s country of origin.3 Most often, however, member states
tend not to impose disabilities on their own authors from which they spare
foreign authors, so I will assume that the measures that I examine would in fact
bear equally on domestic and foreign authors.4
1 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2), Sept.
28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. Similar prohibitions
exist in other multilateral conventions to which the United States is a party. See, e.g.,
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property art. 9(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS] (“Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of
the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto.”); WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 1(4),
Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121 (extending protection to computer programs and
databases: “Contracting Parties shall comply with Articles 1 to 21 and the Appendix of the
Berne Convention.”); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 20, Dec. 20, 1996,
2186 U.N.T.S. 203 (extending protection to sound recordings and certain performances:
“The enjoyment and exercise of the rights provided for in this Treaty shall not be subject to
any formality.”); see also Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances art. 17, June 24,
2012, 51 I.L.M. 1214 (extending protection to audiovisual fixations of performances and
certain unfixed performances: “The enjoyment and exercise of the rights provided for in this
Treaty shall not be subject to any formality.”).
2 I have elsewhere addressed the Berne compatibility of declaratory measures to enhance
title-searching, particularly regarding the recordation of transfers of ownership. See Formal
Constancy, supra note **, at 1611-22.
3 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(3). In theory, therefore, the United States
could go back to punishing its own authors by re-enacting notice and registration
requirements whose non-observance will deprive the work of protection or render any rights
unenforceable. But this theory breaks down under two pressures. One is political, for a
member state may not long treat its own creators much worse than foreigners. The other is
practical, as digital media facilitate manipulation of a work’s country of origin through
remote first publication in a country less benighted than the author’s residence. Id. art. 5(4)
(defining the “country of origin” of a work).
4 The US is an exception, in that it requires works of US origin to be registered as a
prerequisite to suit, but does not impose this obligation on non-US works. See 17 USC
§ 411(a).
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I have elsewhere addressed means through which member states may or
may not achieve some of formalities’ notice-giving and title-searching
objectives.5 Those means include obligations to record transfers of title to
exclusive rights under copyright, and, more controversially, conditioning
“Berne+” protection of subject matter, remedies, or rights on front-door
compliance with notice and registration formalities, or back-door exercise of
opportunities to opt-out of an otherwise applicable and Berne-permissible
exception or limitation. In this Essay, I will further develop the question of
whether Berne member states may, consistently with article 5(2), achieve the
goals of copyright exceptions or limitations by presuming authorization of the
copying or communication to the public unless the author opts out of the
authorization.
The Essay begins with a brief overview of the history of formalities
conditioning the existence and enforcement of copyright, and the policies
underlying their prohibition in Berne article 5(2). It then addresses declaratory
measures that Berne explicitly authorizes, as well as those of more
questionable conformity with treaty norms. Part II takes up the relationship
between formalities and copyright exceptions, particularly in light of laws or
proposals to facilitate mass digitization through opt-outable presumptions of
authorization to digitize and disseminate.
I.
A.

EXISTENCE AND ENFORCEMENT

History and Interpretation of the Berne No-Formalities Rule

Today, article 5(2) of the Berne Convention frames our view of formalities.
We think of formalities as obstacles to authors’ enjoyment or exercise of their
rights, and therefore either deplore them (if we seek authors’ effective
international protection)6 or celebrate them (if we strain to fill the public
domain with works of authorship before those works’ normal period of
copyright expiration).7 At their origin, in the pre-copyright days of printing
5

See Formal Constancy, supra note **.
See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON U.S. ADHERENCE TO
THE B ERNE CONVENTION 177 (1986) (Comments of John M. Kernochan, Nash Professor of
Law, Columbia University), reprinted in 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 689 (1986)
(“The present sanction of forfeiture, in particular, is barbaric in its impact (i.e., it may wipe
out the entire value of years of creative effort); it is disproportionate to any ends served and
should be done away with.”)
7 See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485
(2004); James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 168
(2005) Lawrence Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 56
(2006); Martin Skladany, Unchaining Richelieu’s Monster: A Tiered Revenue-Based
Copyright Regime, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 131 (2012); cf. Séverine Dusollier,
(Re)Introducing Formalities in Copyright as a Strategy for the Public Domain, in O PEN
C ONTENT L ICENSING : F ROM T HEORY TO P RACTICE 75 (Lucie Guibault & Christina
6
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privileges, formalities such as publishing some kind of notice in the work or
recording a copy of the grant with a notary public, served evidentiary purposes;
they did not condition the existence or persistence of the exclusive rights
granted by the sovereign to the author or printer.8 (Though one might think of
having to obtain a privilege in the first place a primordial protectiondeterminative formality.) With the advent of statutory copyright, some national
laws required registration or deposit of the work, but, again, not as a
prerequisite to the vesting of the right. For example, the 1710 Statute of Anne,
the first copyright act, concerned that, “many persons may through ignorance
offend against this Act unless some provision be made whereby the property in
every such book as is intended by this Act to be secured to the proprietor or
proprietors thereof may be ascertained,” required registration of the work with
the Stationers Company. The British courts nonetheless concluded that
formalities conditioned only the special statutory remedies; common law
remedies remained available when the author or proprietor had not registered
the work with the Stationers Company..9 Other countries, however, notably the
U.S., made punctilious compliance with multiple statutory formalities a
condition of both the existence and the enforcement of copyright.10
The role of formalities as barriers to protection arose primarily when authors
or publishers sought exclusive rights for territories outside the work’s country
of origin. In the international context, an author or rightholder needed first to
ascertain if a foreign state protected foreign works at all, and if so, under what
conditions. For example, in the absence of a bilateral treaty, some states would
not protect foreign works, yet the criteria for characterization of a work as
domestic, for example, by “first” publishing a foreign author’s work on the
host country’s territory, and in conformity with that country’s formalities, may

Angelopoulos eds., 2011) (advocating formalities as a means to opt out of—rather than
into—copyright protection).
8 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Proto-Property in Literary and Artistic Works: SixteenthCentury Papal Printing Privileges, 36 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 345, 361-62 (2013) (discussing
role of formalities in Papal printing privilege system).
9 See, e.g., Blackwell v. Harper [1740] 2 Atk 93, 26 Eng. Rep. 458; Beckford v. Hood
[1798] 7 TR 620, 101 Eng. Rep. 1164. The 1793 French Act establishing the exclusive right
of reproduction, Law of 19-24 July, 1793, art 6, provided, “Tout citoyen qui mettra au jour
un ouvrage, soit de littérature ou de gravure, dansquelque genre que ce soit, sera obligé d'en
déposer deux exemplaires à la Bibliothèque nationale ou au cabinet des estampes de la
République, dont il recevra un reçu signé par la bibliothèque; faute de quoi, il ne pourra être
admis en justice pour la poursuite des contrefacteurs.” French courts ultimately rejected
contentions that library deposit of the work was a precondition to the existence of copyright,
rather than a limitation on its exercise. See Judgment of Mar. 1, 1834, Cass. crim., 1834
Dev. & Car. 1.65.
10 Copyright Act of 1790 §§ 3, 4, 1 Stat. 124, 125; Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591
(1834).
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have brought multinational protection within reach.11 Nonetheless, proving
timely publication could be complicated, especially when the author sought
“first” publication in multiple states.12 Even with the advent of bilateral treaties
dispensing authors from the need to manipulate the place of “first” publication,
protection abroad may still have required that the foreign author comply with
all formalities imposed on local authors.13
Against this background, it is understandable that from the outset of the
mid-19th century movement for international copyright, authors advocated the
abolition or restriction of formalities. Proper compliance with multiple national
formalities was cumbersome, costly, and often unsuccessful, hence authors’
demand as early as the first international Congress aimed at securing authors’
rights, held in Brussels in 1858, that authors be protected in all countries so
long as they satisfied whatever formalities their home countries imposed. The
1886 and 1896 versions of the Berne Convention adopted this approach.14
In practice, however, it turned out to be difficult to prove to foreign
authorities that the author had complied with the country of origin’s
formalities.15 As a result, the 1908 Berlin revision prohibited the imposition of
formalities on foreign authors altogether, although member states remained
free to require that domestic authors affix notice, register claims, and/or
deposit copies with local authorities.16 And, to ensure that an author’s failure to
carry out domestic formalities—with a consequent loss of protection in the
country of origin—would not affect the availability of international protection,
the Berlin revisers specified that “apart from the provisions of this Convention,
the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author
to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country
where protection is claimed.”17 The effect of this language was to confer
11

See, e.g., Routledge v. Low, LR 3 HL 100 (1868) (US author first published in
England and journeyed to Canada for a few days’ stay at the time of publication; Canada
being a British colony, and the short visit sufficed to establish Canadian residence, which in
turn was deemed British residence, thus conferring British nationality on the work).
12 See, e.g., Guichard v. Mori (1831) 2 Coopers 216 (“[A]n author beyond the sea who
desires to secure any privilege here, either to himself or any one to take under him, should
publish here immediately . . . Could he come forward several years after publication abroad,
and treat an intermediate publication in this country as a piracy, many foreign works would
never be published amongst us at all.”). This case is discussed in Ronan Deazley,
Commentary on International Copyright Act 1838, PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (14501900), http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_uk
_1838 [https://perma.cc/YCD4-5QYL].
13 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING
RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND (2d ed. 2006), ¶¶ 1.19, 1.40.
14 Id. ¶¶ 6.83-6.85, 6.102-6.103
15 Id. ¶¶ 6.86-6.87.
16 Id. ¶¶ 3.12, 6.87.
17 Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(2) (art. 4(2) in the Berlin revision).
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copyright throughout the Berne Union, automatically and upon creation, on
every Convention-covered work created by an author who was a national of a
Berne Union member state, or first published within a member state. The noformalities rule thus fundamentally undergirds the Berne Convention system of
universal international authors’ rights.
But what are “formalities” in the Berne sense? Article 5(2) declares that “the
enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any
formality.”18 Although earlier texts refer to “conditions and formalities,” it has
long been understood that the term “any formality” encompasses both “formal
and material conditions” on the existence or enforcement of rights.19 “These
rights” are “the rights which the[] respective laws [of the countries of the
Union] do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights
specially granted by this Convention.”20 Thus, a foreign author is entitled to
national treatment in Berne member states (but without having to comply with
any formalities the state may impose on its own authors), as well as to any
additional Convention-guaranteed rights, even if these are not afforded to local
authors.
The “enjoyment” of local or Berne minimum rights extends to “‘everything
which must be complied with in order to ensure that the rights of the author
with regard to his work may come into existence’. These would include such
requirements as registration, the deposit or filing of copies, the payment of
fees, or the making of declarations.”21 In addition to the initial attachment of
protection (since 1908 automatic upon creation for authors from other Berne
member states), the concept of “enjoyment” of copyright would include the
persistence of protection for the minimum Berne term of copyright; obligations
to register and renew copyrights thus would fall under the prohibition.22 The
scope of rights (including any limitations or exceptions) also comes within the
“enjoyment” of Berne and national rights.23 A member state may neither
condition the initial attachment of copyright on compliance with formalities
nor subsequently deny coverage of particular rights to authors who fail to meet
declaratory obligations. Thus, for example, a member state may not subject the

18

Id.
See generally RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13, ¶¶ 6.102-6.104.
20 Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1).
21 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13, ¶ 6.103 (quoting the German delegate Dr.
Meyer at the 1884 Diplomatic Conference).
22 See e.g., STEF F. VON GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW 195 (2011).
23 In addition to art 5(1)’s command that “Authors shall enjoy” rights under national law
and under Berne minima, Berne arts. 11, 11bis, 11ter, 12 and 14bis all provide that “authors
shall enjoy” the specific minimum rights to public performance, adaptation and
cinematographic works.
19
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translation right24 to registering the work or filing a notice of reservation of
rights.25
Berne precludes not only formalities that condition the existence of
copyright, but also those that freight its “exercise.”26 Without the second
prohibition, an author might be vested with copyright, but unable to enforce
her rights unless she complies with a variety of prerequisites to suit or to
availability of remedies.27 Copyright-specific conditions on access to judicial
process or to injunctive relief (including seizure and destruction of infringing
articles) or to actual damages therefore contravene Berne norms. By contrast,
general litigation obligations, such as payment of filing fees, or general
procedural or evidentiary requirements, while they may affect the enforcement
of a copyright claim, are not “formalities” in the Berne sense so long as they
apply to all actions, whatever the subject matter.28 Beyond these general
observations, specific issues concerning the Berne-compatibility of declaratory
obligations that condition the enforcement of rights warrant fuller development
in the next Section.

24

Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 8 provides that “Authors of literary and artistic
works protected by this Convention shall enjoy the exclusive right of making and of
authorizing the translation of their works throughout the term of protection of their rights in
the original works.”.
25 Cf. Treaty for the Safeguarding of Property Rights, Austria-Sardinia, art. III, para. 2,
July 14, 1840 (requiring author to reserve and exercise translation rights within six months),
available
at
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?
id=record_d_1840 [https://perma.cc/RR32-Z6KE]. On the Austro-Sardinian Convention in
general, see Laura Moscati, Il caso Pomba-Tasso e l'applicazione della prima convenzione
internazionale sulla proprietà intellettuale, in MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR D’ANNE LEFEBVRETEILLARD 747, 754-57 (Bernard d’Alteroche ed., 2009).
26 Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
27 VAN GOMPEL, supra note 22, at 200 (“[I]t seems that the word ‘exercise’ was added so
as to elucidate that the prohibition did not only cover constitutive formalities, but also
formalities that are prerequisites to sue.”).
28 Arguably, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)’s system of notice and takedown could be considered a
“formality” because notice is a prerequisite to relief. Nonetheless, the argument is
unpersuasive because the information that § 512(c)(3) requires is not a condition precedent
to seeking relief akin to the § 411 pre-suit registration obligation, but corresponds to what
one would have to prove in court. The requirements that, in a civil action, the author prove
that she is the author, that she created the work, that she published it on a particular date,
and that the work is original, are not “formalities,” but are the facts in issue. Berne art. 5(2)
does not dispense the author from proving those facts in the proceeding that will determine
if she is entitled to relief. It means that the author need not register a document attesting to
those facts before she can even initiate a procedure to seek relief (at which she will have to
prove the facts). Transposed to § 512(c)(3), the facts in the notice are the facts that must be
pleaded to obtain the temporary restraining order-like remedy of a takedown. They are the
procedure, they are not a screen barring the author from access to the process.
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Which “Conditions” on the Existence or Enforcement of Rights Does Art.
5(2) Permit?
1.

Permissible Conditions

Not every “condition” on the existence or enforcement of protection is a
prohibited “formality.” For example, under Berne art. 3, a work will not be
protected in the Union unless its author’s nationality or its place of first
publication meets the condition of being a Berne member state. Art. 2(2)
allows member states to make fixation in material form a condition of
protection. Once a work does qualify for protection under the Convention,
however, member states may not impose declaratory or other conditions
precedent to the enjoyment or exercise of domestic and conventional rights.
With this possible exception: with respect to works still under copyright in
their countries of origin, but in the public domain in a newly-acceding member
state (or still under copyright in the new member state, but in the public
domain in other member states), article 18(1) requires member states to restore
the copyrights in these works, but article 18(3) allows member states to
determine “the conditions of application of [the restoration] principle.”
A member state may not decline to restore copyrights in qualifying foreign
works in the local public domain: article 18(3) makes clear that the restoration
principle must be applied. But that provision grants member states
considerable latitude to determine how to restore copyright in formerly public
domain foreign works. “Conditions” on the implementation of restoration
might well include declaratory obligations. For example, section 104A of the
U.S. copyright law reinstates copyright automatically,29 but protects “reliance
parties” who had exploited the work in good faith before its restoration, by
requiring restored copyright owners to file a “Notice of Intent to Enforce
Restored Copyright” in the Copyright Office or by service on the reliance
party.30 In other words, before she may enforce her copyright against a reliance
party, the author or copyright owner of a formerly public domain work must
comply with a detailed declaratory obligation31 in order to put reliance parties
on notice of the restored owner’s claims. By virtue of article 18(3), this
declaratory obligation, albeit a significant limitation on the enforcement of
copyright, seems fully compatible with Berne norms.

29 See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(A) (“Copyright subsists, in accordance with this section,
in restored works, and vests automatically on the date of restoration”).
30 Id. § 104A(c).
31 The details are set out in id. § 104A(e).
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Incentives versus Obligations: Rewarding the Effectuation of
Declaratory Measures by Offering Litigation or Remedial
Enhancements

If Berne prohibits the imposition of sanctions for noncompliance with
declaratory obligations, another approach might be to substitute carrots for
sticks. Authors who comply with registration or other requirements might
enjoy evidentiary advantages or qualify for additional remedies.
a.

Evidentiary Advantages

Evidentiary advantages might provide meaningful incentives to authors or
rightholders to register their works and record transfers of rights, thus
facilitating title searching. For example, according presumptive probative
value to the publicly-recorded information if the registration or recordation is
made within a certain period32 may encourage compliance with these
declaratory measures. Making timely registration prima facie evidence of a
work’s originality, thus placing the burden on the defendant to prove lack of
authorship, may further stimulate registrations. Presumptions of originality
arising from timely registration may significantly enhance the author’s ability to
enforce her rights, particularly if courts would otherwise impose a high burden
of proof of the original character of the author’s expression.33
b.

Remedial Advantages

Berne’s prohibition on formalities requires that copyright remedies, such as
injunctive relief and actual damages, remain available to foreign authors who
have not locally registered their works or undertaken other locally-imposed
declaratory measures. Although the Berne Convention itself specifies no
remedies other than border seizures of infringing copies,34 Berne anticipates

32 See, e.g., 17 USC §§ 410(c) (certificate of registration serves as prima facie proof of
information there recorded, if registration is effected within five years of publication), 412
(statutory damages and attorneys fees available only if work registered before infringement
occurred, “unless . . . registration is made within three months after the first publication of
the work”). See [1993] COPYRIGHT, 142, 154; ¶¶ 73–76 (permissibility of laws giving
registration information the effect of a rebuttable presumption of the correctness of the
information). Reinbothe & von Lewinski indicate that measures to “facilitate proof of
authorship” are not prohibited formalities. See Jörg Reinbothe & Silke von Lewinski, THE
WIPO TREATIES ON COPYRIGHT: A COMMENTARY ON THE WCT, THE WPPT, AND THE BTAP
at 89, ¶ 7.3.39 (2d ed. 2015).
33 See, e.g., Paris Court of Appeals, first chamber, decision No. 143/2015 (8 September
2015), reversing Paris Tribunal of Grand Instance decision No. 12/05634 (27 March 2014)
(reversing trial court’s ruling that plaintiff heir of French author Albert Camus had failed to
prove the expressive originality of Albert Camus’ unpublished letters).
34 Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 16.
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that member states will supply the “means of redress.”35 These are determined
by local law,36 but, over and above the national treatment rule, they remain
subject to the overall no-formalities proviso.37 By the same token, the TRIPS
Accord requires member states to include injunctive relief within the available
panoply of remedies;38 TRIPS’ incorporation of the Berne no formalities rule
means that member states may not condition remedies on compliance with
formalities.
c.

Other “Incentives”: Remedies in Excess of TRIPS Minima, Such as
Statutory Damages and Attorney’s Fees

If Berne and TRIPS preclude conditioning express or implicit conventional
minimum remedies on fulfillment of formalities, might member states create
incentives for compliance with declaratory measures by subjecting additional
remedies to a compliance obligation? In other words, might there be a category
of Berne+ remedies for which imposition of formalities would be permissible?
When the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989, it retained the
provision in the Copyright Act that limited availability of statutory damages
and attorney’s fees to works which had been registered before the infringement
occurred.39 This provision was thought to afford meaningful incentives to
registration that are “compatible with Berne since it deals with certain specific
remedies rather than the ability to obtain redress at all.”40 In general, the
argument holds that remedies that exceed the protections mandated by
international instruments are not subject to the Berne minima no-formalities
rule. So long as the member state requires its own authors to comply with any
declaratory obligations, then imposing the same obligations on foreign authors
remains consistent with the rule of national treatment. Berne neither addresses
nor, arguably, assumes availability of statutory damages and attorney’s fees;
TRIPS includes these measures among its specified remedies, but it does not
require member states to provide them.41 It might follow that conditioning the

35

Id. art. 5(2).
Id.
37 It has been suggested that Berne does not in fact require member states to include
injunctive relief within their remedial arsenals, and that member states might therefore
condition that remedy on compliance with declaratory measures, leaving undeclaring
authors with some form of equitable remuneration in lieu of injunctions, see Sprigman,
supra note 7, at 555-60. For detailed rebuttal of this contention, see Formal Constancy,
supra note **, at 1593-97.
38 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 41(1).
39 Pub. L. 94-553, tit. I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2583 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 412 (2012)).
40 FINAL REPORT OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE BERNE
CONVENTION 53 (1986), reprinted in 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 565 (1986).
41 TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 44(1), 45(2); see infra text accompanying notes 59-62.
36
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availability (to local and foreign authors alike) of these remedies on some act
of public filing is both Berne- and TRIPS-compatible.
The non-mandatory character of these remedies, however, does not
necessarily mean that a member state that chooses to include them may also
condition them on compliance with formalities. Structurally, one may contend
that all of the TRIPS provisions pertaining to copyright, whether substantive or
remedial, are subject to the overarching no-formalities rule by virtue of TRIPS’
incorporation of Berne’s norms.42 As a result, even optional remedies may not
be made subject to compliance with formalities.43 Member states’ freedom to
determine the “means of redress,” including by devising remedies additional to
the basic forms of monetary and injunctive relief, does not entitle them to
selective adherence to the no-formalities rule. Suppose, for example, that a
member state provided expedited judicial or administrative process for
copyright infringement claims, but only if the rightholder had registered the
work before the alleged infringement occurred. This procedural advantage,
albeit innovative and perhaps unique to that member state, is nonetheless a
“means of redress.” Ultimately, the Berne+ remedies argument rests on a
fundamental fallacy. Article 5(2) does not distinguish between traditional or
basic remedies and additional, unusual, or new remedies: all remedies come
within “the means of redress.” Under this reading, there is no such thing as a
Berne+ remedy, and therefore no basis to impose formalities on the availability
of some remedies but not others.
C.

Other Berne+ Approaches

If there are no Berne+ remedies on which to condition compliance with
declaratory measures, are there nonetheless other aspects of copyright to which
a Berne+ approach might apply? For example, conditions on Berne+ subject
matter, duration, and rights might all fall outside the no-formality rule
(assuming, for purposes of the rule of national treatment, that local authors also
incurred the same duties44).
1.

Subject Matter

Article 2 of the Berne Convention sets out the subject matter that member
states must protect. Notably absent are sound recordings. And Berne’s
coverage of computer programs and databases is arguably ambiguous.45 But
42

TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 2(2), 9(1).
Thanks to Prof. Susy Frankel for this point.
44 Berne+ subject matter, rights, and remedies that come within the ambit of the TRIPS
Agreement remain subject to national treatment and MFN obligations. See Susy Frankel,
Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 1023, 1031-32 (2009).
45 On computer programs, see SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
AND POLICY 232 (2008):
43
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those gaps have been filled by other treaties that also incorporate the noformalities proviso.46 There are, however, two categories of article 2 works
that are susceptible to Berne-compatible declaratory obligations. Article 2(4)
provides, “it shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to
determine the protection to be granted to official texts of a legislative,
administrative and legal nature, and to official translations of such texts.”
Berne thus permits member states to exclude official texts altogether from
the subject matter of copyright: the phrase “determine the protection” may also
be understood to authorize the coverage of official texts, but subject to various
conditions, such as declaratory obligations.
Article 2(7) allows member states:
. . . [T]o determine the extent of the application of their laws to works of
applied art and industrial design and models, as well as the conditions
under which such works, designs and models shall be protected. Works
protected in the country of origin solely as designs and models shall be
entitled in another country of the Union only to such special protection as
is granted in that country to designs and models; however, if no such
special protection is granted in that country, such works shall be protected
as artistic works.
This rather convoluted provision47 allows member states to separate works
of applied art from other artistic works and to prescribe a distinct (noncopyright) regime in which formalities might feature.48 Article 2(7) derogates
from the general conventional rule of independence of international protection
from the existence of protection in the country of origin, because article 2(7)
provides that if the country of origin protects applied art only under a noncopyright regime, then Union countries may similarly restrict the protection of
the foreign work of applied art. Thus, if the country of origin covers a work of
applied art only by means of a design patent (hence, through a mandatory
registration system), other Berne members may also require that the work be
registered (and comply with other prerequisites). But, if the country of origin
protects applied art under copyright or if the Berne member where protection is
The question of whether computer programs are covered as ‘works’ under the Berne
Convention and, consequently, benefit from national treatment and minimum rights, is
not easy to answer; indeed, for some time after the emergence of computer programs,
views were quite divergent and no authentic interpretation could be ascertained.
(footnotes omitted).
See also RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13, ¶¶ 8.92-.103 (arguing that computer
programs fall within Berne subject matter both on first principles and as a matter of state
practice). On databases, see id. ¶¶ 8.88-.91 (arguing that Berne subject matter includes
original compilations of data).
46 See treaties cited supra note 1.
47 For its history, see, for example, RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13, ¶¶ 8.59–
8.69.
48 See VAN GOMPEL, supra note 22, at 170.
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sought does not have a special regime for applied art, then the Berne member
must accord formality-free copyright protection to the work of applied art. As a
result, whether Berne members may impose formalities on works of applied art
depends on the nature of protection in the country of origin.
2.

Duration

We have noted that formalities, such as renewal registrations, that condition
the duration of copyright during the Berne minimum term violate article 5(2).49
But member states might institute mandatory renewal obligations after the
lapse of the Berne minimum term. Thus, a member state with a life+70 term
might condition domestic and foreign authors’ enjoyment of the extra twenty
years on a renewal filing. Moreover, if the term of protection in the country of
origin is shorter than the term in the country of protection (for example,
life+50), then the rule of national treatment does not apply as to duration, and
member states may either deny the last twenty years of protection altogether50
or impose renewal obligations on foreign works.51
Consider the following concrete example. The Berne minimum term for
cinematographic works is fifty years from first making available to the public
with the consent of the author.52 For pre-1978 works, the U.S. term of
protection is ninety-five years from publication, as it is for works made for hire
created as of 1978; audiovisual works frequently are works made for hire.53 If
a Berne member state’s domestic duration for cinematographic works does not
exceed the Berne minimum, the United States could, consistently with Berne,
withhold protection for the remaining forty-five years altogether, or condition
protection on fulfilment of a renewal obligation in the United States. If the
copyright’s duration in the country of origin exceeds the Berne minimum, but
is less than the U.S. duration,54 the Berne Convention calls for the rule of the
shorter term: unless the host state’s legislation provides otherwise, the foreign
work will be protected for the length of the term in the country of origin, rather
49

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(8) (“however, unless the legislation of that
country otherwise provides, the term shall not exceed the term fixed in the country of origin
of the work”).
51 In the latter event, however, the member state must also require the same of local
authors; apart from duration, the rule of national treatment remains as a general background
obligation. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13, ¶¶ 6.93–.97.
52 Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(2).
53 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 302, 304 (2012).
54 For example, under the EU Term Directive, the duration of protection of audiovisual
works is seventy years from the death of the last survivor of the director, the screenwriter, or
the composer of the score. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing
the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 2(2), 1990 O.J. (L 290)
9, 11. It is conceivable in a given case that seventy years could elapse from the last
survivor’s death before ninety-five years from publication have run out.
50
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than for the longer term in the host country.55 As a result, the United States
could require a renewal registration for protection to apply between expiration
in the country of origin and expiration of the United States’ ninety-five-year
term, or it could simply deny protection for the remainder of the U.S. term. For
that matter, Congress could, consistently with Berne, require initial and
renewal registrations of U.S. and foreign audiovisual works fifty years (the
Berne minimum) following their first publication or making available to the
public.
3.

Berne+ Rights?

At first blush, one might conclude that, given both the breadth of the Berne
minimum substantive rights (as supplemented by TRIPS, the WIPO Copyright
Treaty (“WCT”), and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
(“WPPT”)) and the principle of national treatment, there are no Berne+
substantive rights whose exercise might be conditioned on an obligation to
comply with declaratory measures. As our analysis of “Berne+ remedies”
indicates, even if the “extent of protection, as well as the means of redress”56
exceed Berne minima, a member state may neither impose formalities on the
availability of the remedy, nor on the scope of the right (apart from duration);
“Berne+ right” is as much a misnomer as “Berne+ remedy.” The next section,
however, will explore the counterarguments to this conclusion.
II.
A.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORMALITIES TO COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS

Berne Art. 10bis(1): A Template for Permissible Opt-Out Formalities?

One might conceptualize a departure from Berne rights into Berne+ territory
through the back door of exceptions. National laws might start from the
exceptions and limitations that Berne permits member states to impose, and
then might provide that the otherwise permissible exception or limitation
would not apply if the author or rightholder undertook a prescribed declaratory
measure. In effect, this approach would allow authors to “opt out” of an
exception or limitation by declaring their objection to its application.57 Berne
article 10bis(1) arguably supplies the template, stating:
55

Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(8). The United States does not currently apply
the rule of the shorter term. See 17 U.S.C. § 104(a)-(c).
56 Berne Convention, supra note 1, art 5(2).
57 This approach differs from the one advocated by the Copyright Principles Project,
which would render an unregistered work more subject to the fair use defense than a work
whose copyright had been registered. See Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright
Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1200 (2010)
(“Unregistered works would still be protected by copyright law against exact or near-exact
copying that would cause commercial harm, but fair uses might well be broader as to such
works.”). This proposal violates Berne article 5(2) because it makes the scope of copyright
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It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit
the reproduction by the press, the broadcasting or the communication to
the public by wire of articles published in newspapers or periodicals on
current economic, political or religious topics, and of broadcast works of
the same character, in cases in which the reproduction, broadcasting or
such communication thereof is not expressly reserved. . . .
In other words, the reservation from the exception in effect expands the
author’s rights to cover uses which otherwise would permissibly have limited
the scope of the reproduction and communication rights.
Is the express reservation opt-out then a Berne-compatible declaratory
measure that might apply to other otherwise permissible national law
exceptions? The short answer is “no” because declaratory measures still
condition the “extent of protection”: whether formalities come in at the front
end (the availability of the right) or at the back end (the applicability of an
exception), they still shape the scope of protection. The drafting history of the
Berne Convention indicates that art. 10bis(1) is a “lex specialis,”58 a sui
generis provision that, although it may derogate from the default no-formalities
norm, does not create a basis for generalization into a technique for instituting
declaratory measures. A predecessor version of the article 10bis(1) reservation
was introduced in the original 1886 Berne Act (in then-article 7), and carried
over in the 1908 Berlin Revision (then-article 9(2)), whose travaux explicitly
state that the reservation option was not a formality.59 Since the 1908 Berlin
Revision also established the no-formalities rule, this assertion should carry
some weight.
A slightly longer answer would emphasize the context in which article 9(2)
of the Berlin Revision arose. Although today the provision (now article
10bis(1)) looks like an opt-out from a limitation on the scope of the rights of
reproduction and communication to the public, and therefore arguably like a
condition on the scope (enjoyment) of Berne minimum rights, at the time of
the provision’s drafting, it operated more like a condition on the protection of
Berne+ subject matter. At that time, the subject matter the provision addressed
—“any article published in a newspaper or periodical”—was widely believed
dependent on registration: failure to comply with the registration formality means that the
work will be subject to greater incursions on exclusive rights than registered works would
be.
58 See, e.g., SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY
AND ARTISTIC WORKS, ¶ 5.85 (1987); Alexander Peukert, A Bipolar Copyright System for
the Digital Network Environment, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 66 (2005).
59 Rapport Présenté à la Conférence au Nom de sa Commission (Louis Renault,
Président et Rapporteur), in UNION INTERNATIONALE POUR LA PROTECTION DES ŒUVRES
LITTERAIRES ET ARTISTIQUES, ACTES DE LA CONFERENCE REUNIE A BERLIN DU 14 OCTOBRE
AU 14 NOVEMBRE 1908 AVEC LES ACTES DE RATIFICATION, 240 (Bureau de L’Union
Internationale Littéraire et Artistique 1910) [hereinafter Records of the 1908 Revision
Conference].
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not to be copyrightable in the first place.60 The original Berne act of 1886
excluded “the news of the day” and “mere items of press information” from the
Convention’s subject matter (this exclusion persists in article 2(8) of the
current text). Further, the 1886 Berne and 1896 Paris Revision texts denied
coverage to articles “of political discussion.”61 The existence of international
copyright protection for anything published in a newspaper was thus both
questionable and controversial, as the evolution of the text in 1896 and 1908
reveals. The 1896 revision clarified that newspaper serializations of novels
were fully protected;62 the need to safeguard serials attests to the taint
periodical publication must have had on works that would otherwise seem
amply copyrightable. The 1908 travaux allude to journalists’ contentions that
their writings deserved “greater respect.”63 Berlin Act article 9(2) thus was a
compromise measure to provide copyright protection to otherwise excluded
subject matter, provided the rightholder (generally the publisher) reserved the
rights.64 In historical context, therefore, the article 10bis(1) reservation is better
characterized as a declaratory measure intended to bring Berne+ subject matter
within the ambit of protection rather than as a condition on the scope of
protection.
1.

Situations to Which Opt-Out Exceptions Might Apply

Taking article 10bis(1) out of context, for the sake of argument, how might
its express reservation approach be generalized to import declaratory measures
into the scope of rights? It is important to bear in mind that this technique
cannot impose conditions on Berne minimum rights, else it will fail under the
general article 5(2) prohibition. Thus, any exception or limitation from which
an author might opt-out by means of an express reservation must be an
exception or limitation which is already Berne-compatible. I underscore that
the possibility to opt-out should not be what makes an otherwise impermissible
60

For an extended discussion, see id. at 249-54.
Convention for the Creation of an International Union for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works art. 7, Sept. 9, 1886, 12 Martens (2nd) 173; Additional Act Modifying
the International Copyright Convention of 9 September 1886 art. 7, Apr. 5, 1896, 24
Martens (2nd) 758 [hereinafter Berne 1896 Paris Revision].
62 Berne 1896 Paris Revision, supra note 61, art. 7.
63 Records of the 1908 Revision Conference, supra note 59, at 249 (“Des réclamations se
sont élevées de différents côtés dans le sens d’un respect plus grand du droit des
journalistes.”)
64 It seems to have been assumed that the reservation would have been made by means of
a notice in the newspaper or periodical upon initial publication. See Records of the 1908
Revision Conference, supra note 59, at 253 (quoting German delegation proposal). It is
unlikely that the drafters envisioned further formalization of the reservation through some
kind of governmental filing in the country of origin, much less in multiple countries: such a
requirement would have too closely resembled the multiple formalities rejected from the
outset of the Berne Union.
61
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exception or limitation Berne-compatible.65 If, for example, a member state
either denied the translation right or broadly subjected it to compulsory
licensing (an exception or limitation plainly inconsistent with the three-step
test) unless the author expressly reserved translation rights, then the author
would not enjoy Berne and TRIPS minimum protection without complying
with declaratory obligations. That in turn would violate article 5(2).66
By contrast, a member state exception that applied equally to domestic and
foreign authors and did pass the three-step test, for example, the retransmission
in bars and restaurants of radio broadcasts of dramatic musical compositions,67
could perhaps be made subject to an express reservation condition.68 In that
case, the reservation would give the author greater rights than Berne requires.
One may nonetheless acknowledge that the Berne-compatibility of a given
potential exception may not always be clear, and that ambiguity invites a slide
down the slippery slope towards finding an exception Berne-permissible
because it allows opting-out. An exception scrutinized under the three-step
test—(1) certain special cases, (2) that do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work, and (3) do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the author69—and that passed the first two steps, might find its
likelihood of satisfying the third step enhanced if the author’s ability to opt out
diminished any prejudice otherwise incurred.
For a hypothetical application of the three-step test, first suppose an
exception of arguable consistency with Berne norms, for example, digitization

65 For assertion of the contrary contention, see Martin Senftleben, How to Overcome the
Normal Exploitation Obstacle: Opt-Out Formalities, Embargo Periods, and the
International Three-Step Test, 1 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. COMMENTARIES 1, 16,
http://btlj.org/data/articles2015/Commentaries/1-berkeley-tech-l-j-comm-0001-0019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8H6B-K7X6].
66 Moreover an exception as broad as the one posited here would fail the “special case”
criterion of the three-step test. See VAN GOMPEL, supra note 22, at 191 (“Berne Union states
may not go as far as introducing overly broad exceptions of limitations that would have the
effect of subjecting the enjoyment or the exercise of the right as such to situation-specific
formalities,” because to do so “would oppose the first of the three steps, according to which
an exception or limitation can only be imposed in certain specific cases.”) But one could
imagine a succession of more discrete exceptions, each individually a “special case,” but
which cumulatively subjected the enjoyment of the right to compliance with formalities.
67 See Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶ 7.1(a),
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000)(holding 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)’s exemption of retransmissions
of non dramatic musical compositions to violate the three-step test, but finding the
application of the exemption to dramatic musical compositions to be compatible with the
three-step test).
68 For the reasons indicated infra Section II.A.2, any such reservation should be a onetime declaration; the author should not be obliged to file reservations in each country whose
national law allows authors to opt out of Berne-permissible exceptions.
69 Berne Convention, supra note 1, art 9(2); TRIPS, supra note 1, art 13.
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of out-of-print hardcopy books for nonprofit educational purposes.70 Second,
give authors or their successors in title the opportunity to oppose the
digitization and dissemination of their books. Third, apply the three-step test as
follows: step one: the class of works covered by the exception constitutes a
“special case” because the class is (arguably) well-defined both as to the works
covered (out-of-print books) and as to the use (non profit education).71 Step
two: there is no “conflict with a normal exploitation of the work” because an
out-of-print book isn’t being exploited, and because the author or rightsholder
can secure future or derivative exploitations by opting-out; if the author or
rightsholder doesn’t opt-out, that must mean there is no actual or potential
market for the work, or that the author or rights holder doesn’t “care” about
exploiting it. Step three: the exception does not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate rights of the author because the opt-out enables the author to avoid
all prejudice, unreasonable or otherwise.72

70

The Court of Justice for the European Union has ruled that libraries may create digital
copies of books in their collection in order to display the contents on dedicated terminals
located in the libraries, see, CJEU Case C 117/13, Technishe Universität Darmstadt v.
Eugen Ulmer KG (11 September 2014). In the US, library scanning and storage has been
ruled fair use where the outputs were limited to data-mining or full-text access for the
visually impaired. See Authors Guild v. Hathi Trust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). The
Second Circuit has also ruled scanning and storage even for commercial purposes to be fair
use, so long as the output is limited to non copyrightable information or de minimis
expression. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). By contrast,
courts in the EU have held that the scanning and storage of full texts for commercial
purposes does not qualify for any of the domestic law exceptions authorized under the 2001
Information Society Directive. See, e.g., Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, judgment of
18 December 2009, Editions du Seuil v. Google (finding that Google Books’ program of
scanning and storage violated French copyright law).
71 Though it is less apparent that the exception is narrow in application, given the
potentially substantial numbers of out of print hardcopy books.
72 Member states can satisfy the third step by providing compensation, or equitable
remuneration, for the permitted use, but in our hypothesis there may be no need to
compensate the author for uses she was neither making nor licensing.
I do not wish to imply that an exception for non-profit educational digitization of out-ofprint books could not pass the three-step test; on the contrary, such an exception,
conditioned on the beneficiary’s performance and documentation of a diligent search for
rightholders, may well be permissible under Berne. Cf. Directive 2012/28/EU, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of
Orphan Works, arts. 2(1), 6(1), 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5, 9–10 (requiring member states to
“provide for an exception to the right of reproduction and the right of making available to
the public . . . to ensure that [certain public-interest organizations] are permitted to use
orphan works contained in their collections in [certain educational and preservation ways]”
and providing that “[a] work or a phonogram shall be considered an orphan work if none of
the rightholders in that work or phonogram is identified or . . . located despite a diligent
search for the rightholders having been carried out and recorded . . .”). But ruling the
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In this scenario, even if the opt-out rendered the exception Bernecompatible, the author must still accomplish a declaratory measure in order to
preserve her exclusive rights; on its face, the measure seems a formality
conditioning the enjoyment or exercise of her rights. That is, the same
declaratory measure that might enable the exception to pass muster under the
second and third steps would condemn the exception under the no-formalities
rule. On the other hand, if an applicable exception or limitation already
diminished her exclusive rights, then failure to comply with the formal
measure would not make the author worse off. Compliance will make her
better off and therefore will affect the enjoyment of her rights, but the premise
of an opt-out structure is that Berne does not require her to be “better off” than
the Berne minima (so long as local and foreign authors receive the same level
of protection). Accordingly, it would not matter that formalities condition the
extent of Berne+ protection.
The success of this argument depends largely on whether one credits the
proposition that art. 5(2)’s prohibition stops at Berne minima. We have
contended that a Berne+ approach could apply to subject matter, but if Berne
does not require protection for that subject matter in the first place, then the
Convention as a whole, including its no-formalities rule, does not apply.73 We
have also posited a Berne+ approach to duration, but Berne’s provisions on
duration depart from the general treaty structure in their adoption of a
reciprocity rule. By contrast, we have rejected the Berne+ argument in the
context of remedies, where art. 5(2)’s incorporation of local “means of redress”
provides a textual basis for concluding that the no-formalities rule extended to
remedies more extensive than required by the Convention. Indeed, given
Berne’s paucity of specified remedies, if the no-formalities rule did not apply
to national means of redress, the rule would be substantially eviscerated. By
the same token, art. 5(2)’s incorporation of the local “extent of protection”
should be equally subject to the no-formalities rule, whether that extent
coincides fully with Berne minima, or exceeds them. The relative lack of
substantive Berne minima when the no-formalities rule was adopted in the
1908 Berlin revision,74 with the corresponding relegation of core substantive
exception Berne-compatible because it offers an opt-out, is highly problematic, and might
well violate Berne if the opt-out substituted for a diligent search.
73 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1) (“Authors shall enjoy, in respect of
works for which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other
than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter
grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.”). It
follows that the Berne Convention does not require that authors enjoy either national
treatment or conventional minimum rights with respect to works for which they are not
protected under the convention.
74 The 1908 revision required member states to protect rights of public performance (art.
11), adaptation (art. 12), adaptation of a musical work into a sound recording, with the
possibility to condition the right on national compulsory licenses (art. 13), cinematographic
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rights, such as the right of reproduction,75 to national law, reinforces the
conclusion that Berne+ rights may not be conditioned on compliance with
formalities, including through the back door of exceptions.
2.

Problems of Implementation of Opt-Out Exceptions

Practical considerations furnish additional reasons to be wary of opt-out
exceptions. As a preliminary matter, the proposition that the possibility of
opting out lets the exception pass steps two and three of the Berne article
9(2)/TRIPS article 13 test ignores the details of the opt-out’s implementation.
Unlike the article 10bis(1) news reporting exception whose drafters appear to
have assumed a simple and uniform means of opting out by publication of a
notice in the newspaper,76 the three-step test allows member states to tailor
national exceptions to their own needs, and not all Union members’ needs or
policies need be the same.
Thus, member states’ exceptions may vary widely, as may the means they
provide for opting out. The proliferation of national opt-outable exceptions
imposes an increasing burden on foreign authors to ascertain the existence and
scope of the local exceptions and to take the steps necessary to avoid their
application. Recent Canadian legislation offers a good example of the
problems of opt-outable exceptions. Section 30.04 of the “Copyright
Modernization Act,” S.C. 2012, c. 20, provides:
30.04 (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (5), it is not an infringement of
copyright for an educational institution, or a person acting under the
authority of one, to do any of the following acts for educational or
training purposes in respect of a work or other subject-matter that is
available through the Internet:
(a) reproduce it;
(b) communicate it to the public by telecommunication, if that public
primarily consists of students of the educational institution or other
persons acting under its authority;
(c) perform it in public, if that public primarily consists of students of the
educational institution or other persons acting under its authority; or

adaptations (art. 14). The French text of the 1908 Berlin Revision is available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=278699
[https://perma.cc/8JKRZMXY].
75 A general right of reproduction was not added to the substantive minima until the 1967
Stockholm revision. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13, ¶¶ 11.03-11.19.
76 Records of the 1908 Revision Conference, supra note 59, at 253 (quoting German
delegation proposal). It is unlikely that the drafters envisioned further formalization of the
reservation through some kind of governmental filing in the country of origin, much less in
multiple countries: such a requirement would have too closely resembled the multiple
formalities rejected from the outset of the Berne Union.
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(d) do any other act that is necessary for the purpose of the acts referred
to in paragraphs (a) to (c).
...
(4) Subsection (1) does not permit a person to do any act described in that
subsection in respect of a work or other subject-matter if . . .
(b) a clearly visible notice — and not merely the copyright symbol —
prohibiting that act is posted at the Internet site where the work or other
subject-matter is posted or on the work or other subject-matter itself.
Professor Victor Nabhan has questioned the compatibility of this provision
with Berne article 5(2), and has also emphasized difficulties of
implementation: many Internet sites enumerate permitted uses, but do not list
prohibited uses (the prohibition of uses falling outside the authorized list
should be implicit); Prof. Nabhan reads the Canadian text to require specific
prohibition. The failure of these websites to set out a distinct prohibition of
educational uses would therefore mean that the website author has not properly
opted-out of the exception.77
The tension with Berne anti-formality norms becomes all the more apparent
when one considers the practical impact were other countries to enact similar
opt-out exceptions. Suppose, for example, in addition to Canada’s requirement
that the author of an Internet-available work specifically prohibit reproduction
or communication to the public (etc.) “for educational or training purposes”,
that Berne member state X established out-outable exceptions for public
performance in religious services, and Berne member state Y instituted optoutable exceptions to the reproduction right for the visually impaired, and
Berne member state Z provided opt-outable exceptions to all exclusive rights
for purposes of promoting mass digitization of out-of-print works. If, as in
Canada, a general copyright notice did not suffice to effect the opt-out, it
would seem that authors or right holders would be obliged, on a continuing
basis, to ascertain what opt-outable exceptions each member state has enacted,
and to object specifically to the permitted use. In addition to the content of the
objection, the manner of communicating the opt-out also may become unduly
complicated. For example, for Internet-available content, must the author
continually update her website and the work’s metadata to add specific
objections as member states add to their panoply? Moreover, what
consequences to the author if third parties remove the notice from the
metadata, and downstream recipients therefore lack notification of the author’s
reservation of rights?78 For works in analog formats, will each member state

77

See Victor Nabhan, Canada : prise en compte par la loi des nouveaux usages et
consécration par la jurisprudence d’un droit à l’exception en faveur de l’usager 94 Lamy
Revue du Droit de l’Immatériel 35, 36 (June 2013).
78 While metadata standards, incorporating information relevant to copyright
management exist, see, e.g., standards proposed by the International Press
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create a registry of objections? Will there be a centralized registry for opt-outs,
perhaps administered by WIPO? The more one contemplates the
implementation of national opt-outs, the more apparent their incompatibility
with Berne norms.
An author’s failure to opt out of a plethora of national exceptions through
their related formalities may simply reflect limited resources, rather than a
rational evaluation of the impact of the exception on her future exploitation of
the work. The more complicated the opting-out, the less persuasive the
empirical assumption underlying scope-conditioning formalities, that authors
do not make the necessary declarations because they do not “care” about how
their works are exploited. Multiple diverse national opt-outs also impose a
burden on users to determine whether, where, and to what extent unauthorized
copyright-implicating acts may be permissible. Thus, rather than decreasing
the title-searching transaction costs, this variant on formalities could in practice
make them more onerous for all concerned.
Moreover, exceptions can vary over time as well as between member states.
Even if a one-time declaration at the initial public disclosure of a work may not
seem unreasonably burdensome, either via a copyright registry or perhaps by
means of digital metadata79, what of exceptions that member states enact after
the work is disseminated? In such cases, the implementation of the opt-out
appears especially daunting. Even if the member state provides an effective
means for authors to take exception, such a system would demand that authors
remain constantly on guard for the loss of rights throughout the world as new
exceptions come into force—a degree of vigilance that is even more
demanding than registration ab initio.80 Thus, if the opt-out is what makes the

Telecommunications Council [IPTC] for information embedded in photographs,
https://www.iptc.org/std/photometadata/documentation/GenericGuidelines/index.htm#!Doc
uments/iptccore.htm [https://perma.cc/8UKY-UP2E], many Internet platforms, including
Facebook, Instagram, Flickr, Tumblr, Twitter, Pinterest, LinkedIn and Google Photo,
practice metadata-stripping, hiding or deleting information identifying the author and
concerning the terms of use of the photo. See, e.g., Social Media Sites Metadata Test
Results,
IPTC,
http://www.embeddedmetadata.org/social-media-test-results.php
[https://perma.cc/WUD5-AAKV] (IPTC study assessing the extent to which websites
remove or modify photo files’ metadata). Removal of an opt-out notice might constitute a
violation of WIPO Copyright Treaty member states’ art. 12 obligation to protect “rights
management information” (partially implemented in U.S. law at 17 U.S.C. sec. 1202), but
the high burden of proof of intent to facilitate infringement makes the outcome of an
enforcement action uncertain. Moreover, such an action adds insult (and costs) to injury: it
puts authors in the position of having to enforce the protection of a rights-reservation notice
that they should not have been obliged to provide in the first place.
79 Indeed, authors should be encouraged to provide rights-management information, and
technologists should help authors achieve that end.
80 For example, if the opt-out were contained in the copy’s metadata, the author cannot
retrieve already-dispersed copies to amend their metadata, and (constantly) altering the
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exception Berne-permissible, then perhaps the exception cannot apply to works
created before the exception’s enactment. But if prospective-only opt-out
requirements alleviate the unfairness that would result from requiring old
works to carry new declarations, prospectivity also seems to undermine the
local policy concerns, such as those to render out of-print works more
accessible, that prompted adoption of the exception because a prospective-only
exception will not apply to older works.
3.

Policy Objections

Opt-out formalities are problematic for three other reasons as well. First,
even leaving aside the plausibility of its premises, allowing the possibility of
an opt-out to bear on the outcome of the three-step test is particularly
problematic in light of the first step. The essence of the opt-out proposal is
that, so long as the class is narrowly defined, the opt-out may satisfy (or
override) the second two “steps” and the first step’s “special case” limitation
itself may be eluded through a series of individually well-defined exceptions.
Taken separately, each exception might constitute a “special case.” But in the
aggregate the exceptions would significantly erode the formally exclusive
right. This incremental approach to the first step would thus eviscerate the test,
effectively allowing significant incursions on authors’ rights, so long as they
are accomplished piecemeal through the back door of exceptions.
Second, the more complicated the implementation of the opt-out, the more it
resembles the multiple formalities banned from the outset of the Berne
Convention. As discussed above, integrating the opt-out into the three-step test
opens the door to the enactment of a variety of member state-specific
exceptions and requirements—not necessarily congruent, coordinated, or even
consistent—which risk unduly burdening authors (and users) and seem
metadata for new copies would simply cause confusion among users. This difficulty has
already been noted with respect to metadata for opting out of copyright protection;
transposing the opt-out from protection to exceptions (in effect, requiring the author to optin to full copyright protection), would appear to pose the same problem. Cf. Association
Littéraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI), Memorandum on Creative Commons
Licenses, ALAI.ORG (January 2006), http://www.alai.org/assets/files/resolutions/creativecommons-licenses.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZMP-QRWX] (While [the author] can cease to
offer the work herself with the license, or can offer a more restrictive CC license directly
from her website, she will probably not be able to stop the circulation of copies previously
accompanied by prior terms of the license. In that case, it would seem that different versions
of CC licenses with regard to the same work might simultaneously be in force.);
Consideration
for
Licensors
and
Licensees,
CREATIVE
COMMONS,
https://wiki.creativecommons.org/index.php?title=Considerations_for_licensors_and_licens
ees [https://perma.cc/7JD6-6AL8] (“Remember the license may not be revoked. Once you
apply a CC license to your material, anyone who receives it may rely on that license for as
long as the material is protected by copyright and similar rights, even if you later stop
distributing it.”)
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increasingly like the trap for the unwary that rightly brought formalities into
disrepute.
Third, large and/or sophisticated copyright owners may understand the need
systematically to opt out of exceptions and might have the means to undertake
the necessary declarations. Smaller copyright owners and individual authors
may not understand the opt-out regime (nor, depending on how it was
implemented, be in a position to assume its burdens). The opt-out therefore
would perpetuate, and aggravate, the disparate impact that formalities systems
already wreak on individual creators.81 As a general proposition, an exception
should pass three-step muster on its own merits; if it does not, then, as this
analysis has shown, adding an opt-out feature should not save the exception
from Berne-incompatibility.
B.

Reconciling the No-Formalities Rule with Other Policy Objectives: Mass
Digitization

In light of all the above objections, is there nonetheless a Berne-compatible
means to enable mass digitization in the absence of specific authorization by
the authors or rightholders? Several countries have essayed variations on optout authorizations, but they have confined their application to domestic works,
hence avoiding conflicts with Berne norms.82 Might it nonetheless be possible,
consistently with Berne, to implement a default authorization for non
commercial digitization of out-of-print hardcopy works from other Berne
Union states, or to authorize cross-border dissemination of works digitized in
the country of origin?

81 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright
Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 454-55 (2009) (“The
prompt registration requirement for statutory damages has not become a meaningful
inducement to registration for all authors who value copyright protection, but rather a
substantial boon to major copyright industry players—the commercial exploiters of
copyrighted works whose rights largely derive from the Act’s work for hire rules or
assignments from authors . . . . ‘Little guy’ authors thus, in theory, have the same strong
legal rights as major copyright industry players, but effectively no way to get relief when
their rights are infringed.”); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of
Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 383 n.27
(2005) (noting formalities “could actually discriminate against individual creators who are
unable to carry the burden of legal counseling and registration.”)
82 See, e.g., France, Loi no 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l’exploitation
numérique des livres indisponibles du XXe siècle (1) [Law 2012-287 of Mar. 1, 2012 on the
Digital Exploitation of Unavailable Books of the Twentieth Century], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 2, 2012 , p. 3986,
(effective as of the publication of décret n°2013-182 of Feb. 27, 2013 on the application of
articles L.134-1 to L.134-9 of the Code of intellectual property); art. L. 134-1 specifies that
the law applies only to books published in France before 2001.
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The EU Orphan Works Directive83 suggests one approach. It authorizes
public educational establishments, libraries, museums and broadcasters to
reproduce and communicate to the public works whose rightowners cannot be
identified or located notwithstanding a diligent search. A diligent search in the
work’s country of first publication or broadcast will suffice to allow use
throughout the EU.84 Thus, while the exception is EU-wide, to benefit from the
exception, the user need comply with only a single member state’s law.
However, while the Orphan Works Directive simplifies the transnational
application of an exception, it does not present a problem of compliance with
formalities because it does not include an opt-out mechanism. Indeed, a work
may, at the time of first publication, have followed all formal steps, but with
the passage of time, rightholder-location information may have fallen out of
date. Nonetheless, the Directive’s technique of reducing search costs by
designating the country of origin as the locus of a search of community-wide
validity may furnish one element in the construction of a Berne-compatible
multi-territorial mass digitization program.
Suppose, for example, that a national law authorized the digitization of outof-commerce works first published in hardcopy in that state before 2000 (a
date that roughly corresponds to the pervasive availability of many kinds of
works in digital form). The law designated the national library to publish lists
of works that the library ascertained were out of commerce, and gave authors
and rightholders six months following the lists’ publication to object to third
party digitization. After six months, third parties may digitize and disseminate
the works,85 including beyond national borders. An author resident in that state
(but who failed to make a timely objection) brings an infringement action
based on the communication of the digitized work to a neighboring state.
While Berne norms do not apply to authors who reside in the Berne Union
state in which the alleged infringement occurred (assuming that country was
also the country of the work’s first publication),86 they do apply to non resident
Berne Union authors who allege that an infringing act (communication of the
digitized copy) took place in a different Berne member state.
The first question in this instance would be whether under the law of the
state in which the alleged infringement occurred (i.e., the state in which a
communication was received or an offer to communicate the work was
directed87), the act would be infringing, or instead would qualify for a local

83

Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 March
2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, 2012 O.J. (L 299).
84 Id. ¶¶ 3(3); 4.
85 The hypothetical law is inspired by the French law of March 1, 2012, supra note 81.
86 See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(3) (“Protection in the country of origin is
governed by domestic law.”).
87 The infringement, the making available of the digitized work, arguably occurs both in
the country from which the offer to communicate the work is made and in the country to
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(Berne-compatible) copyright exception. If in the country of exploitation, the
exception would not apply in the absence of an opt-out, the next question
would be whether the opt-out in the country of origin would be effective in the
country of exploitation, and would therefore bring the exception within Berne
norms. If other Berne Union states credited country of origin opt-outs, rather
than imposed their own conditions, many of the practical implementation
issues discussed above would be alleviated. There remain two significant
questions: first, whether an opt-out can sanitize uses that otherwise would
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or otherwise would
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author or rightholder;
second whether the opt-out, even if consonant with the three-step test, is an
impermissible formality under art 5(2). As we have seen, the interrelationship
of the two questions advises much caution, lest a proliferation of opt-out
exceptions ultimately shift international copyright from the Union-wide
property right that vests upon creation (as envisioned ever since the 1908
Berlin Revision), into a series of declaratory obligations whose non
effectuation sets the default to non protection.
Arguably, if other Berne Union countries credit the country of origin optout, they are not themselves imposing formalities, they simply are giving effect
to a formality that Berne entitles the country of origin to impose. Nonetheless,
we still encounter the problem that the author will not preserve exclusive rights
outside the country of origin unless she fulfills a declaratory obligation. Other
Berne Union countries thus would indirectly be conditioning the exercise of
rights on compliance with formalities. As the French high court has
recognized,88 Berne’s tolerance of domestic formalities is limited to the
country of origin. The article 5(2) principle of the independence of
international protection from the existence of protection in the country of
origin necessarily renders fulfillment of country of origin formalities irrelevant
to the existence of international protection. If other Berne member States
denied protection to foreign works on the ground of non compliance with
formalities in the foreign work’s country of origin, then the domestic
formalities would take on international effect, and this is a result plainly
inconsistent with the Berne Convention. Indeed, it was precisely to prevent
domestic formalities from compromising international protection that the
Berlin revisers added what became article 5(2), establishing the independence
which the work is communicated. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Where Does the Act of
“Making Available” Occur?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU INTERNET LAW 191 (Andrej
Savin & Jan Trzaskowski eds. 2014). If the court applies the latter characterization, then the
law of the country of receipt will apply. See, e.g., Editions du Seuil, supra note 70.
88 Soc. Eds. Montparnasse v. Gaumont Columbia Tristar Home Video, Court of
Cassation, First Civil Chamber, decision of 17 December 2009, Juris-Data No. 2009050769; Communication Commerce Électronique, July-August 2010 p. 13, note Yves
Gaubiac pp 10-12 (rejecting application in France of U.S. renewal formality as a
prerequisite to a work’s qualification for restoration of copyright under Berne art. 18(1)).
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of international protection from the existence of protection in the country of
origin.
Thus, if the opt-out, even if permissible for purposes of the three step test,
were deemed a formality in the sense of art 5(2), then it would not be possible
to structure a transnationally effective Berne-compatible mass digitization
program that relied on opting out of national exceptions.89 But if Berne
prohibited all cross-border effect of a mass digitization program, even for non
profit educational purposes, unless the authors affirmatively consented to the
use, then the number of works enrolled might be less than desirable, or the
transactions costs of obtaining wider consent too daunting. Hence the appeal of
an opt-out approach, shifting the burden of objection to the author. Under what
circumstances, then, might an opt-out system escape condemnation under
article 5(2)?
The answer may turn on the object of the opt-out. If to preserve her rights,
the author must opt-out of the application of a measure that goes to the
existence or scope of protection, the opt-out should be deemed an
impermissible formality under art 5(2). If, by contrast, the opt-out goes to a
presumption of grant of an exclusive or non exclusive license, then that
measure might not violate art. 5(2). I have argued elsewhere that declaratory
measures concerning transfers of ownership are not “formalities” in the
prohibited Berne sense.90 If the national law were structured to presume a
transfer of digitization rights to a local collecting society, which would in turn
issue licenses to qualifying users, then it would fall outside art. 5(2).91 This
technique appears unproblematic for authors who have already authorized local
collecting societies to administer their rights of reproduction and/or
communication to the public, particularly if the presumed grant of rights
yielded revenue (potentially state-paid) from the licensee’s exercise of the
digitization rights.
But if an author is not a member of the relevant collective management
society, how can that society grant her digitization rights? This is where the

89

But see Johann Axhamn & Lucie Guibault, Cross-Border Extended Collective
Licensing: A Solution to Online Dissemination of Europe’s Cultural Heritage?, Final
Report for EuropeanaConnect, INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW RESEARCH PAPER 2012-19
at 46, Aug. 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001347 (arguing that
in the context of opt outs for extended collective licenses – discussed infra – if the limitation
complies with the three-step test, it should also be deemed permissible under Berne art.
5(2)).
90 See, Formal Constancy, supra note **, at 1611-22; RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra
note 13, ¶ 6.105 (national author-protective requirements, such that transfers of title be in
writing and signed by the author, are not “formalities”).
91 By contrast, a presumption of implied license to users at large to engage in mass
digitization seems a state expropriation of rights, and essentially equivalent to an
unremunerated exception.
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“extended collective licensing” (“ECL”) technique comes into play.92 As the
US Copyright Office has described it, “When the collective negotiates a
license with a particular user that license is automatically extended – by
operation of law – to all of the rights owners for those works, regardless of
whether they belong to the collective organization or not. All copyright owners
are entitled to receive a share of the royalties that the collective receives from
its licensees. In some countries, copyright owners may be allowed to opt out of
some uses of their works or demand individual remuneration if they believe
that they are entitled to a larger share of the royalties for the use of their
works.”93 If local legislation so empowers it, when the collective negotiates
with a local institutional user, such as a museum, school or a library, to
authorize digitization of the works it represents, the corpus will include the
works of local authors who have not specifically authorized the collective to
grant those rights.
The transnational effect of ECL licenses so far has been limited to reciprocal
agreements among collectives in the countries that have adopted ECL
measures,94 and it appears the Berne-conformity of such agreements has not
been challenged. To the extent ECL measures resemble mandatory collective
licensing, that is, “national law requirements that copyright licensing be carried
out exclusively by a collecting society (with little freedom for the author to
resist this),” it has been argued that the latter is not the kind of condition on
exercise of rights that article 5(2) targets.95 In general, apart from specifying
the independence of moral rights even after the transfer of economic rights,
and barring certain actions by second-level co-authors of a cinematographic
work against the work’s “maker”,96 Berne does not intervene in author-

92 According to a 2011 Copyright Office study, LEGAL ISSUES IN MASS DIGITIZATION: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION DOCUMENT, at 34-36, the application of ECLs has
so far not extended to mass digitization, though there may be some prospect for such an
extension. See See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: KEY PRINCIPLES ON THE
DIGITISATION AND MAKING AVAILABLE OF OUT-OF-COMMERCE WORKS, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/copyright- infso/20110920-mou_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9CN6-PG3J].
93 LEGAL ISSUES IN MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 92, at 35.
94 The Extended Collective Licenses regime of the Nordic countries are limited to
domestic exploitations, but the collecting societies have reciprocal agreements with
collecting societies in other states. See, e.g., Thomas Riis and Jens Schovsbo, Extended
Collective Licenses and the Nordic Experience: It’s a Hybrid but is it a Volvo or a Lemon?,
33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 471, 473-76 (2010).
95 See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13, at para. 6.105 & n.322.
96 Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 6bis (“(1) Independently of the author’s economic
rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor
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exploiter relationships. “The rationale and effect of” national rules designating
entities to exercise the author’s licensing of rights “are profoundly different
from public-protective formalities, such as notice or registration, or copyrightspecific litigation hurdles, which seek to shield the public from authors’
claims. In the former instance, the formal rules tell us who is entitled to enforce
a copyright whose existence the rules do not call into question. In the latter
instance, the formalities limit any claimant’s enforcement, and may destroy the
copyright altogether.”97
One might posit national legislation in Country A that presumes a transfer of
both domestic and foreign rights in works of local origin to the collecting
society, subject to an opt-out. Country A’s collecting society then could enter
into reciprocal agreements with similarly-empowered collecting societies in
Countries B and C (etc.), or Country A’s society could exercise those rights
itself, for example, by authorizing the making available from Country A to
Countries B and C of works digitized in Country A under A’s extended
collective license.98 An author from Country A who did not opt out of the
presumption of transfer would be deemed to have transferred her rights to the
Country A collective not only for exploitations of the digitized work in
Country A, but also for Countries B and C (etc.). Had author A directly
authorized a co-contractant in Country A to license rights in her work
throughout the Berne Union, there is little doubt under general principles of
private international law, that Countries B and C would recognize the grant
(though local norms in B and C might restrict the scope of the grant, for
example to decline to give local effect to a purported transfer of moral
rights99). Whether Country B recognizes author A’s transferee as the holder of
rights for Country B is a matter of Country B’s private international law rules.
or reputation.” (emphasis added)); art. 14bis(2)(3) (rights of co-authors other than
screenwriters, composers and principal directors against maker of cinematographic work).
97 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13, at para. 6.105.
98 These speculations do not intend to minimize the practical challenges of creating such
collecting societies, particularly in countries, such as the U.S., in which collecting societies
are both less pervasive than elsewhere, for example in the European Union, and operate
under considerable antitrust constraints. For further, and skeptical, discussion of those
challenges, see Pamela Samuelson, Extended Collective Licensing to Enable Mass
Digitization: A Critique of the U.S. Copyright Office Proposal, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2683522 at 2-8. For a more sanguine
view, see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION 82105
(June
2015),
http://copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan-works2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q8FN-NQ48]
99 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY - PRINCIPLES GOVERNING
JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES § 314 (2008)
(law of country for which rights are transferred determines the scope of the transfer); Cour
de cassation, première chambre civile [Cass. 1e civ.], May 28, 1991, Bull. civ. I, No. 172
(Huston v. La Cinq) (Fr.) (French law applies to determine the assignability of moral rights).
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If Country B would recognize an arms-length transaction in Country A
transferring rights for Country B, would it also recognize a presumption of
transfer? Country B’s copyright-contract law may or may not entertain
presumptions of transfer in the ECL context, and by the same token, may
determine what acts rebut the presumption of transfer (and its copyrightcontract law or its private international law may determine whether a country
of origin opt out preserves the author’s rights in Country B), but because these
questions go neither to the existence nor the enforcement of copyright
protection, they do not implicate the Berne no-formalities rule.
Thus, an ECL regime establishing an opt-outable presumption of transfer of
digitization rights in out-of-commerce works to a collecting society in the
country of origin, paired with reciprocal agreements among collecting societies
in other Berne Union states whose legislatures have also authorized ECL
regimes should enable educational and cultural institutions in each
participating state to digitize local works and communicate them to other
participating states. With such a network of reciprocal agreements, licenses
obtained from the collective by local educational and cultural institutions
should entitle those institutions to access not only local but also foreign works
digitized under the ECL licenses. Under an alternative structure, the country of
origin collective would license rights for foreign uses as well. Those licenses
would entitle local educational and cultural institutions to make local works
available to foreign users, but local users who wished to access foreign works
then would be obliged to obtain licenses from each foreign collective.
Is this distinction, between a Berne-objectionable regime of opt-outable
exceptions and a Berne-compatible regime of opt-outable presumptions of
transfers, unpersuasively formalistic? In this context, is there any meaningful
distinction between a license presumed in law and an exception? Any
difference would not rest on availability of compensation because the
exception could require remuneration, and the license might be free of charge.
But there are practical differences. First, as we have seen, whether an opt-out
may enable an otherwise Berne-prohibited exception to pass the three-step test
is highly controversial. Second, as we have also seen, national law exceptions
may vary both in scope and in implementation, and complying with different
opt-out mechanisms may trip up many authors. National ECL opt-outs might
also vary, but if it suffices to comply with the requirements in the country of
origin for the author to withhold her work from local or foreign digitization
and dissemination, it becomes possible to avoid the complexities and pitfalls of
multiple national opt-out regimes.
CONCLUSION
Requiring the author to opt-out of a restriction on the scope of her exclusive
rights violates the Berne Convention’s prohibition on subjecting “the
enjoyment and the exercise” of her rights to compliance with formalities. The
prohibition applies even when a member state provides rights that exceed the
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conventional minimum scope of rights. This Essay has analyzed the practical
and policy issues that underlie this conclusion. By contrast, Berne does not bar
opt-out measures that pertain to the administration of authors’ rights by
collective management organizations, particularly in the context of extended
collective licenses. In this instance, the opt-out notice does not affect the
existence and scope of the author’s rights. Rather, it goes to the licensing and
management of authors’ rights, whatever their content or extent. Berne
generally leaves unaddressed issues going to ownership, transfer and licensing
of authors’ rights; member states may fill that gap, including by mandating or
presuming the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of the author’s rights to a
collective management organization. Two considerations will determine the
effectiveness of those organizations’ grants of rights for territories beyond the
works’ countries of origin. First, whether the author’s actual or presumed grant
to the collective management organization included extraterritorial rights
Second, whether the copyright-contract and private international law rules of
the countries for which the author granted rights will recognize the validity of
the grant, particularly if the licensor’s authority to exercise the author’s rights
in foreign states (including by means of reciprocal agreements with equivalent
organizations in other states) derives from a presumption of transfer from
authors who are not members of the licensing organization.

